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CHEVRON INSIDE THE REGULATORY STATE:  
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
Christopher J. Walker* 
INTRODUCTION 
For three decades, scholars (as well as courts and litigants) have written 
thousands of articles (and opinions and briefs) concerning the impact of 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.1 on judicial 
review of agency statutory interpretation.  This should come as no surprise 
as Chevron is the most cited administrative law decision of all time.2  Little 
attention, however, has been paid to how Chevron and its progeny have 
actually shaped statutory interpretation inside the regulatory state.3  Indeed, 
as Jerry Mashaw observed nearly a decade ago, ―virtually no one has even 
asked, much less answered, some simple questions about agency statutory 
interpretation.‖4  Professor Mashaw concluded with a call for more 
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drafting.  Thanks also to Professor Chris Holloman of The Ohio State University‘s Statistical 
Consulting Service for technical support; to Chris Larocco, James Mee, and Justin Nelson as 
well as Moritz librarian Matt Cooper for research assistance; and to the Center for 
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 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking 
Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 & n.2 (2014) (reporting citation 
counts for U.S. Supreme Court administrative law decisions). 
 3. Two contributors to this symposium explore other aspects of the role of Chevron 
inside the regulatory state. See Emily Hammond, Chevron’s Generality Principles, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 655 (2014) (exploring the effect of Chevron on agency behavior in rarely 
reviewed types of agency actions); Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, 
and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679 (2014) 
(exploring the President‘s role in Chevron‘s deference regime).  Another contribution, by 
contrast, provides a unique perspective on the impact—or, better said, lack thereof—of 
Chevron on state administrative law. See Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State 
Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2014). 
 4. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference:  A Preliminary 
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (2005); see 
also id. at 502 n.2 (reviewing literature). 
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―[i]nquiry into the empirical realities of agency interpretive practice [to] 
provide a crucial window on these issues and an essential step in the 
assessment of the legitimacy of administrative governance.‖5 
As part of the Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30:  Looking 
Back and Looking Forward, this Essay answers Professor Mashaw‘s call to 
action and presents the findings of the first comprehensive empirical 
investigation into the effect of Chevron and related doctrines on how 
federal agencies interpret statutes they administer.6  The Essay draws on a 
larger, 195-question survey of federal agency rule drafters that covered a 
variety of topics related to agency statutory interpretation.7  The survey was 
modeled on Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe Gluck‘s pioneering study on 
congressional drafting,8 which Professor Gluck‘s contribution to this 
symposium further explores.9  The author administered the survey during a 
five-month period at seven executive departments (Agriculture, Commerce, 
Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Housing and 
Urban Development, and Transportation) and two independent agencies 
(Federal Communications Commission and Federal Reserve).  Responses 
were received from 128 agency officials whose primary duties included 
statutory interpretation and rulemaking (for a 31 percent response rate).  
Although concerns for confidentiality and deliberative process privilege 
imposed methodological limitations on the survey—including anonymity as 
to the individual respondent and the respondent‘s respective agency—the 
study‘s findings provide a crucial window into Chevron‘s influence on 
agency interpretive practices. 
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of the 
deference doctrines and the empirical study.  Part I.A introduces the main 
deference doctrines and the theoretical work to date on how those doctrines 
may affect interpretive practices inside the regulatory state.  This part 
focuses on Jud Mathews‘s deference lottery theory, which proposes that the 
 
 5. Id. at 537. 
 6. For an overview of the symposium, see Shane & Walker, supra note 2. 
 7. The full findings from the empirical study are reported elsewhere. See Christopher J. 
Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter 
Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501716 .  The 
survey consisted of thirty-five main questions, with twenty-three questions containing three 
to thirty-three subquestions.  In this Essay, those questions (and relevant subquestions) are 
cited.  The survey is attached as an appendix to Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra, 
and is available separately online. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation:  
Survey Appendix (Aug. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Walker, Survey Appendix], 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481631. 
 8. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I]; Lisa Schultz Bressman 
& Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II].  Thanks again to Professors Bressman and Gluck 
for sharing their survey, methodology, and experiences from this congressional drafting 
study. 
 9. Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 (2014). 
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deference framework in administrative law be viewed through the game-
theory lens of a lottery.10  This framework sheds considerable light on how 
varying standards of review may affect agency interpretive practices.  Part 
I.A also discusses recent congressional efforts to instruct courts to apply 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.11 instead of Chevron on certain issues—a 
legislative invention Kent Barnett has coined ―Chevmore codification‖ in 
his contribution to this symposium and elsewhere.12 
The Chevmore codification and deference lottery theories both rest on 
empirical assumptions that federal agencies actually know and use these 
judicial deference doctrines when drafting regulations and that the agencies 
would draft regulations differently depending on which standard applied.  
In other words, if they knew the more deferential Chevron standard 
applied—as opposed to the Skidmore or de novo standards—the agencies 
would advance more aggressive statutory interpretations, and vice versa.  
Part I.B outlines the survey methodology to test these empirical 
assumptions and introduces the 128 agency rule drafters who responded to 
the survey.  Parts II and III report the findings as to these two sets of 
empirical assumptions, respectively. 
As discussed in Part II, the agency rule drafters surveyed were well 
aware of Chevron (at 94 percent) and Skidmore (at 81 percent), and 
indicated that Chevron (at 90 percent) and Skidmore (at 63 percent) played 
a role in their rule-drafting decisions.  Although United States v. Mead 
Corp.,13 another case crucial in the analysis, was not as well known by 
name (at 61 percent), the rule drafters confirmed that they understood the 
basic principles articulated in Mead—i.e., congressional authorization of 
rulemaking or formal adjudication (at 84 percent) and the agency‘s use of it 
(at 80 percent) affect whether an agency‘s interpretation receives Chevron 
deference.  The rule drafters also reported that the Chevron presumption of 
delegation may have exceptions for certain types of ambiguities—some of 
which are consistent with existing judicial precedent and some not.  For 
instance, fewer than half believed that Congress intends to delegate by 
ambiguity major policy questions (at 32 to 56 percent, depending on 
phrasing), preemption of state law (at 46 percent), or serious constitutional 
questions (at 24 percent). 
As for the second set of empirical assumptions, the findings discussed in 
Part III reveal that the vast majority of rule drafters surveyed agreed or 
strongly agreed that they think about judicial review when drafting statutes 
(at 87 percent) and that their chances in court are better under Chevron than 
 
 10. Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2013); see also 
Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2013) 
(responding to Mathews, supra).  Indeed, Professor Mathews‘s framework played an 
important role in the development of the main part of the study presented in this Essay. 
 11. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 12. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Codifying Chevmore], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405016; 
Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise within Chevmore Codification, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014) [hereinafter Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore]. 
 13. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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Skidmore or no deference (at 83 percent).  Moreover, four in ten (38 to 43 
percent) agreed or strongly agreed that federal agencies are more aggressive 
in their interpretive efforts if they know Chevron deference applies; another 
four in ten (40 to 45 percent) somewhat agreed.  Part III then briefly 
explores the rule drafters‘ knowledge and use of various doctrines other 
than the deference standards that could affect how aggressive agencies are 
in their interpretive efforts. 
This Essay provides a new and important window into the role of 
Chevron and its progeny inside the regulatory state.  Based on the findings 
presented in this Essay, it would not be an understatement to conclude that 
thirty years of Chevron have saturated the federal agency rulemaking 
process.  The rule drafters surveyed overwhelmingly indicated familiarity 
with and use of these doctrines in their statutory interpretation efforts, and 
many also indicated that federal agencies are more aggressive in their 
interpretive efforts if they are confident their interpretations will receive 
Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore or no deference at all). 
I.   OVERVIEW 
To understand why Chevron and related doctrines may affect how federal 
agencies interpret statutes, one must first understand the current state of 
judicial review of agency statutory interpretation.  Part I.A briefly presents 
the two dueling deference standards in a post-Chevron, post-Mead world, 
along with the empirical and theoretical work undertaken to date.  Part I.B 
presents the survey methodology and the background on the 128 agency 
rule drafters who responded to the survey. 
A.   The Doctrine:  Dueling Deference Standards 
Administrative law today recognizes two main doctrines with respect to 
judicial review of agency statutory interpretations:  Chevron and Skidmore. 
The first is the familiar, thirty-year-old Chevron two-step approach we 
commemorate with this symposium.  Under Chevron, a reviewing court 
must defer to an agency‘s interpretation of a statute it administers if the 
court finds, at Step One, that ―the statute is silent or ambiguous‖ and then, 
at Step Two, that the agency‘s reading is a ―permissible construction of the 
statute.‖14  The court ―need not conclude that the agency construction was 
the only one it permissibly could have adopted . . . or even the reading the 
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial 
proceeding.‖15 
The second is the much-older Skidmore standard, which, as Peter Strauss 
reminds us in his contribution, also celebrates its seventieth birthday this 
year.16  Unlike under Chevron where an agency‘s reasonable interpretation 
 
 14. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 15. Id. at 843 n.11. 
 16. Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 789 (2014). As 
Professor Strauss notes, Chevron arguably just ―universalized‖ a standard articulated in the 
same year as Skidmore in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Strauss, 
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of an ambiguous statute controls, Skidmore instructs the reviewing court to 
give the agency‘s interpretation ―weight‖ based on ―the thoroughness 
evident in [the agency‘s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade.‖17 
Courts and commentators often call Skidmore and Chevron ―deference‖ 
doctrines, but reference to deference can obscure what is at stake in 
deciding which doctrine should apply to an agency‘s statutory 
interpretation.  To capture the difference, Professor Strauss helpfully 
reframes these doctrines as ―Chevron space‖ and ―Skidmore weight.‖18  An 
agency receives Chevron space to fill in holes in statutes it administers 
because Congress empowered the agency to be ―the authoritative interpreter 
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes.‖19  Or, as Professor Strauss 
puts it, ―the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is 
to see that the ball stays within the bounds of the playing field and that the 
game is played according to its rules.  It is not for courts themselves to play 
the game.‖20  That is not the case with Skidmore weight, where Congress 
has not delegated space for agencies to be authoritative interpreters.  
Instead, Skidmore weight ―addresses the possibility that an agency‘s view 
on a given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by judges who 
themselves have ultimate interpretive authority.‖21 
So even when it has no Chevron space, the agency retains the power to 
persuade based on its special expertise in statutory interpretation.  Agencies 
often have comparative expertise based on their nationwide implementation 
of the statute and their involvement in drafting the statute.22  In sum, when 
framed in terms of Chevron space and Skidmore weight, it becomes clear 
what is at stake when an agency requests Chevron space: 
 
supra, at 791–92; accord Thomas Merrill, The Story of Chevron:  The Making of an 
Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398 (Peter Strauss ed., 2006). 
 17. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 18. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” 
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012); see also Mead, 533 
U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that Chevron ―create[s] a space, so to speak, 
for the exercise of continuing agency discretion‖); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (describing 
standard as ―weight‖ based on ―power to persuade‖). 
 19. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 
(2005).  The author has explored elsewhere how Chevron and related doctrines are motivated 
by constitutional separation of powers values. See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding 
Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law:  A Brand X 
Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 173–82 (2012) [hereinafter 
Walker, Brand X Constitutional Avoidance]; Walker, supra note 10, at 78; Christopher J. 
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule], 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242869. 
 20. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1145. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id.  Indeed, the agency rule drafters surveyed indicated their agencies play a 
substantial role in both the technical and the substantive drafting of statutes and even some 
role in the drafting of legislative history. See Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra 
note 7, at 34–36 & fig.6 (reporting survey findings on agencies‘ role in the legislative 
process). 
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Win, and the agency becomes the authoritative interpreter (within the 
bounds of reason) of the statutory ambiguity.  Lose, and the agency is 
relegated to the role of an expert witness that must rely on its powers to 
persuade the court to adopt the agency‘s preferred reading of the 
ambiguous statute.23 
The lack of Chevron space may result from either of the following:  
(1) Congress has not delegated interpretive authority to the agency; or 
(2) the agency has ―cho[sen] not to exercise that authority, but rather to 
guide—to indicate desired directions without undertaking (as [it] might) to 
compel them.‖24 The clearest evidence of such delegation is statutory 
authority for rulemaking or formal adjudication (and the agency‘s use of it).  
This was the basic takeaway from Mead:  ―a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the rulemaking or adjudication process that 
produces the regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.‖25  In 
City of Arlington v. FCC,26 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it is not 
just ―a very good indicator‖ but a dispositive one.27  But the Mead Court 
noted it had ―sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when 
no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.‖28 
Shortly after Mead was decided, Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman 
labeled the Mead question about when Chevron space or Skidmore weight 
should apply as ―Chevron step zero.‖29  Mead has since received extensive 
scholarly (and judicial) attention.  Indeed, in their separate contributions to 
this symposium, Professors Hickman and Merrill are joined by Jack 
Beermann and Peter Strauss in chronicling that literature as well as debating 
the future of Chevron Step Zero after City of Arlington.30  Moreover, James 
Brudney‘s contribution relies on a dataset of 730 Supreme Court decisions 
to evaluate the use of Chevron and Skidmore in the workplace law 
context.31  And Miriam Seifter‘s contribution rejects the call for a 
federalism exception at Chevron Step Zero.32  Accordingly, the substantial 
literature on Mead will not be further reviewed here. 
 
 23. Walker, supra note 10, at 79. 
 24. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1146. 
 25. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 26. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 27. Id. at 1874 (holding that ―the preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied 
because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer 
the Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation 
at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority‖). 
 28. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.  The Mead Court also confirmed that Skidmore weight 
applies when Chevron deference does not. See id. at 234–38 (reviewing Skidmore factors). 
 29. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
836–37 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006). 
 30. See Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court:  Still Failing After All These 
Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of 
Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528–30 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City 
of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 756–58 (2014); Strauss, supra note 16. 
 31. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace:  Unhappy Together, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498 (2014). 
 32. Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2014). 
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The literature to date, however, has not explored empirically how 
Chevron, Mead, or Skidmore may affect statutory interpretation inside the 
regulatory state.  And these questions are almost as equally undertheorized.  
As for theory, Jud Mathews‘s deference lottery framework is the main 
contribution.  He explains that the interaction between Chevron space and 
Skidmore weight can be viewed as a ―lottery‖ as that term is used in 
expected utility theory33—indeed, a compound lottery ―whose prizes are 
other lotteries.‖34  Agencies face a two-stage lottery when they adopt a 
statutory interpretation.  The first is whether the court will review the 
interpretation for Chevron space or Skidmore weight.  The second is 
whether the court will uphold the agency‘s interpretation under the 
deference standard selected in the first stage.35 
The lottery‘s first stage arises from Mead‘s failure to provide clear 
guidance on when reviewing courts should apply Chevron space or 
Skidmore weight.36  Courts and commentators have bemoaned the 
uncertainty Mead introduced to administrative law.37  And, as Professor 
Mathews has chronicled,38 the empirical studies to date have confirmed the 
existence of a deference lottery after Mead—with the leading studies on the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence by Bill Eskridge, Lauren Baer, and Connor 
Raso39 and the leading study on the courts of appeals by Kristin Hickman 
 
 33.  Mathews, supra note 10, at 1352; see also Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference 
Asymmetries:  Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416516 (modeling how deference regimes may 
push agency statutory interpretation in a pro-regulated-entity direction). 
 34. F.J. Anscombe & R.J. Aumann, A Definition of Subjective Probability, 34 ANNALS 
MATHEMATICAL STAT. 199, 200 (1963) (defining compound lottery). 
 35. Mathews, supra note 10, at 1353; see also Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:  
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 31 (1998) (finding agencies win 89 percent at Chevron Step Two). 
 36. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
 37. See id. at 239–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the confusion Mead causes for 
courts in deciding whether Chevron applies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, 
Agency Rules with the Force of Law:  The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 480 
(2002) (asserting that Mead ―provides little guidance to lower courts, agencies, and regulated 
parties about how to discern congressional intent in any given set of circumstances‖); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine:  Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 813 (2002) (describing Mead as ―an undefined standard 
that invites consideration of a number of variables of indefinite weight‖); Adrian Vermeule, 
Introduction:  Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361 (2003) (arguing that 
Mead ―inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man‘s land‖). 
 38. See Mathews, supra note 10, at 1362–72.  Richard Pierce has similarly reviewed the 
existing empirical work, concluding that ―the studies suggest that a court‘s choice of which 
doctrine to apply in reviewing an agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes 
in the Supreme Court or the circuit courts.‖ Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of 
Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011). 
 39. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, 
Not a Precedent:  An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference 
Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To 
the Chevron Station:  An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
984. 
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and Matthew Krueger.40  However, City of Arlington may have alleviated 
much of the uncertainty about whether Chevron or Skidmore applies in a 
given context by definitively declaring that Chevron always applies when 
Congress vests an agency with rulemaking or formal adjudication authority 
and the agency uses that authority to promulgate its interpretation.41 
Regardless whether there is enough Chevron Step Zero uncertainty to 
make the first stage a meaningful lottery, viewing the deference regime 
through the lottery framework can help us think critically about how 
varying standards of review may affect agency behavior and how courts (or 
Congress) can modify the standards to influence agency behavior.  For 
instance, Professor Mathews argues that having some uncertainty about 
which standard applies—as opposed to always applying Chevron—actually 
―offers a more flexible tool for shaping agency behavior‖ because ―[a] 
deference lottery can encourage a rational agency to choose an 
interpretation that lies somewhere between the safest and the most 
adventurous version that the agency can hope to get away with.‖42  For 
instance, Professor Mathews argues, ―paradoxically, increasing the scrutiny 
an agency will receive under Skidmore can actually encourage an agency to 
adopt a less faithful interpretation of the statute.‖43 That is because if 
Skidmore is difficult to satisfy, ―the expected benefit is higher from 
selecting an interpretation the agency prefers and ‗betting it all‘ on the 
Chevron lottery.‖44  Moreover, if Skidmore were too easy on the agency, 
the agency would have less incentive to adopt a more faithful statutory 
interpretation because it would almost always win the second-stage 
deference lottery.  Simultaneously tightening the Skidmore and Chevron 
lotteries to make it harder for the agency to win may be just as effective at 
encouraging more faithful interpretation.45 
The deference lottery is not just a game for courts and agencies to play.  
Although not explored by Professor Mathews, Congress could also 
intervene to change one or both of these lotteries.  Indeed, as Professor 
Barnett notes in his contribution to this symposium, Congress has actually 
done that in at least one instance.  In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act,46 Congress directed courts to review for 
Skidmore weight any decision to preempt state law made by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).47  Like Professor Mathews, 
 
 40. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has 
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005). 
 41. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013); accord Seifter, supra note 
32, at 640. 
 42. Mathews, supra note 10, at 1354. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1354–55. 
 45. See id. at 1386–87. 
 46. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.). 
 47. Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 12, at 587; see also 12 U.S.C. 
§ 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012) (―A court reviewing any determinations made by the Comptroller 
regarding preemption of a State law . . . shall assess the validity of such determinations, 
2014] CHEVRON INSIDE THE REGULATORY STATE 711 
Professor Barnett goes on to theorize how this change in the deference 
lottery should affect agency behavior, asserting that Chevmore codification 
can encourage the agency to, among other things, develop more expertise 
and engage in more public participation.48  Congressional modification of 
the deference regime would likely have a greater impact on agency decision 
making than just a judicial modification as the congressional directive 
would be reinforced by the courts on judicial review.49 
Until now, however, whether judicial or legislative tinkering with the 
deference standard would actually affect agency behavior seemed plausible 
in theory but unknown in fact.  There are at least two sets of untested 
empirical assumptions:  (1) whether federal agencies know and consider 
these deference doctrines when interpreting statutes; and (2) whether 
federal agencies interpret statutes differently if they know their 
interpretation will receive Chevron space or Skidmore weight.50  Parts II 
and III of this Essay, respectively, attempt to shed some empirical light on 
these questions.  First, however, Part I.B explains the underlying study‘s 
methodology. 
B.   The Empirical Study:  Methodology and Background 
The findings reported in this Essay are drawn from a larger empirical 
study on agency statutory interpretation.51  As mentioned in the 
Introduction, that study was modeled on the 171-question survey conducted 
by Professors Bressman and Gluck on congressional drafting.52  Most of the 
questions relevant to this Essay, however, were not included in the 
Bressman and Gluck study.  Indeed, nearly half (97 of 195) of the questions 
in this study dealt with administrative law doctrines, whereas the Bressman 
and Gluck study included forty-five questions on those topics.53 
Similarly, their methodology had to be adapted to the federal agency 
context where the pool of potential respondents is spread across hundreds of 
 
depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of 
the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by the 
agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision.‖). 
 48. See Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 12, at 605. 
 49. See id. at 605–06. 
 50. A third and related set of assumptions concerns whether the standard of review 
significantly affects the likelihood of agency success in court.  Professor Barnett has noted 
this elsewhere—reviewing the studies to date that suggest the standard does not matter—and 
concluded that if the studies are correct, the ―so-called Skidmore penalties and Chevron 
rewards lose some force.‖ Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, supra note 12, at 63.  Those 
empirical assumptions lie outside the scope of this study, but for purposes of understanding 
the effect of Chevmore codification, they also may not shed too much light.  As Professor 
Barnett has noted, the more important question is whether federal agencies‘ interpretive 
practices differ when Chevron or Skidmore applies:  ―Therefore, even if it is only a myth that 
Chevron and Skidmore lead to different results [in court], that myth [if believed by the 
federal agencies] has purchase on agencies and Congress.‖ Id. at 65. 
 51. This part presents an abbreviated version of the study‘s methodology set forth in 
greater detail in Part I of Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7.  When 
possible, please refer and cite to the longer version of the methodology description. 
 52. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 919–24. 
 53. Id. at 992. 
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federal agencies and offices, and adequate access to that pool would require 
official approval from the agency and not just the individual respondent. 
Accordingly, over the span of nine months, the author reached out to 
officials at every executive department, over eighty agencies and offices 
within those departments, and a dozen or so independent agencies.  
Ultimately, various agencies and offices at seven executive departments and 
two independent agencies agreed to participate.54  As a condition for 
participation, the agencies required that the survey be anonymous as to both 
the respondent and the respondent‘s agency and that it be conducted online 
as opposed to the in-person approach of the Bressman and Gluck study. 
The online survey consisted of thirty-five questions, many of which had 
multiple subquestions for a total of 195 questions.55  The agency point 
 
 54. Some departments limited the survey population to particular agencies or offices, but 
within those populations the survey was sent to all officials identified as having experience 
in statutory interpretation and rulemaking.  A total of forty-one offices, agencies, and 
divisions were included in the survey, with the breakdown by department and independent 
agency as follows (total population sent the survey in parentheses): 
 U.S. Department of Agriculture (55):  Office of General Counsel and eighteen USDA 
agencies and offices (e.g., the Food Safety and Inspection Service, the Forest Service, 
and the Office of Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis); 
 U.S. Department of Commerce (13):  Office of General Counsel, Commerce Bureau 
of Industry and Security, and the U.S. Patent and Trade Office; 
 U.S. Department of Energy (eighteen):  Office of General Counsel; 
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (55):  Office of General Counsel, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Coast Guard; 
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (146):  Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Public Health Division; 
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (10):  Office of General 
Counsel; 
 U.S. Department of Transportation (81):  Office of the Secretary, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Material Safety Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration; 
 Federal Communications Commission (16):  Office of General Counsel; and 
 Federal Reserve (17):  Legal Division.  Unlike the other agencies surveyed, to reduce 
the workload on the Legal Division, the Federal Reserve only sent the survey to a 
seventeen-person subset of potential rule drafters—though the point-of-contact chose 
that subset based on which agency officials are most engaged in rule drafting on a 
regular basis. 
 55. Walker, Survey Appendix, supra note 7.  Because many of the questions build on 
prior questions and in light of concerns about incomplete surveys, see infra note 58, the 
thirty-five main questions were asked in chronological order; subquestions were randomized 
within each main question to minimize response-order effects. See, e.g., Jon A. Krosnick & 
Duane F. Alwin, An Evaluation of a Cognitive Theory of Response-Order Effects in Survey 
Measurement, 51 PUB. OP. Q. 201, 201–19 (1987); William S. Sekely & Vicki L. Blakney, 
The Effect of Response Position on Trade Magazine Readership and Usage, 34 J. AD. RES. 
53, 53–59 (1994).  There are methodological costs to not fully randomizing the survey in 
that the order may affect the answers, though such effects are typically more of an issue with 
attitudinal studies (which this is not). See generally HOWARD SCHUMANN & STANLEY 
PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATTITUDE SURVEYS:  EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION 
FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT (1981).  Moreover, Professors Bressman and Gluck found 
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persons sent the survey via email to the populations of agency officials 
identified as having experience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking, 
encouraging but not requiring them to respond.56  In total, 411 such agency 
officials received the survey, and 128 agency officials responded for a 31 
percent response rate.57  Of the respondents, ninety-eight (77 percent) 
answered each and every question.58  The survey also allowed the 
respondents to make additional comments on most questions; the data set 
includes 345 such comments, including sixty-nine comments in response to 
the administrative law questions. 
So who are these agency rule drafters that responded to the survey?  All 
are career civil servants as opposed to political appointees.59  And all but 
eleven are lawyers.60  Nearly two-thirds have worked at a federal agency in 
a capacity that includes some rulemaking work for at least five years.61  
 
no response-order effects when they scrambled the questions in their related congressional 
drafting survey. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside:  Methods Appendix, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12 & n.45 (2013), available at 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/statutory-interpretation-inside-methods-
appendix.  To help the reader account for any response-order effects, the Essay references 
the relevant question number being discussed—abbreviated as ―Q_‖—with the survey 
reproduced as Walker, Survey Appendix, supra note 7. 
 56. The surveying phase took place over the course of five months at the various 
agencies; the agency contacts followed up with the populations via email roughly two weeks 
after the initial invitation and then a final reminder about two weeks after that.  Of the 128 
respondents, only one answered ―no‖ to the first question about whether the respondent is 
―currently working, or [has] worked within the last two years, in a general counsel office, 
legal department, or other rulemaking office in a federal agency AND that [the respondent] 
had experience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking in that employment,‖ and thus did 
not respond to the survey beyond the background questions. 
 57. The anonymous nature of the survey limits the ability to calculate a response rate by 
agency or department.  However, because the survey was rolled out at different times at each 
agency, the data collected confirm that at least some individuals in all of the population 
pools responded (as opposed to being predominated by one department or independent 
agency). That said, there is no way to assess with precision whether the response rate differs 
across the agencies contacted.  As a result, it is possible that nonresponse bias is strong 
within a single agency due to cultural or other factors.  Moreover, the FDA requested that its 
rule drafters have the option to indicate that they work at the FDA, so the first question was 
modified to allow for the respondents to voluntarily so indicate.  Of the 128 responses, 
twenty indicated that they worked at the FDA.  The size of the FDA rule-drafter population 
that received the survey was seventy, so assuming all FDA respondents self-identified the 
FDA response rate was 27 percent, which is in line with the overall 31 percent response rate. 
 58. The answers from respondents who did not fully complete the survey are included in 
the findings.  A sizeable number of respondents (thirty) provided only partial responses.  
This rate might indicate the survey was intimidating to individuals who did not possess a 
strong grasp of the concepts being discussed, resulting in undersampling of less 
knowledgeable individuals at the agencies.  Another plausible explanation is that some 
respondents tired of the 195-question survey, as there does not appear to be any pattern about 
when respondents stopped answering questions.  Because the main thirty-five questions were 
not randomized (though the subquestions were), supra note 55, the undersampling can be 
taken into account and the total number of respondents ―(n=__)‖ will be included for each 
question—abbreviated as ―Q__ (n=__)‖. 
 59. Q2 (n=128).  As discussed in notes 55 and 58 supra, ―Q__‖ refers to the question 
number in Walker, Survey Appendix, supra note 7, and ―n=__‖ refers to the number of rule 
drafters who answered that question.  The data set is on file with the author. 
 60. Q6 (n=126). 
 61. Q3 (n=128). 
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About four in ten have had a role in the drafting process of at least a dozen 
rules, with another 15 percent in the seven to eleven range, 25 percent in the 
three to six range, and the rest (16 percent) in the zero to two range.62  One 
respondent, for instance, indicated involvement in ―over 500 rulemaking 
actions‖; another indicated that ―[j]ust in the past 7 years, it has been 80 
rules between proposed rules, interim rules, and final rules‖; and a third 
said they were ―too numerous to count.‖63  Moreover, 38 percent are over 
the age of forty-five, 51 percent are between thirty-one and forty-five, and 
the remaining 11 percent are between twenty-two and thirty.64  Four in ten 
(42 percent) respondents took a course in law school on legislation, 
statutory interpretation, or statutory drafting, whereas half (49 percent) did 
not.65  Only one in four respondents have taken such a course other than in 
law school—many via continuing legal education or government training 
programs.66 
Before turning to the findings in Parts II and III, it is important to 
underscore that, as with any survey that attempts to understand human 
behavior, caution should be taken so as to avoid reading too much into the 
rule drafters‘ responses.  Despite the fact that all rule drafters at these 
agencies were sent the survey, not every executive department, much less 
every federal agency, agreed to participate.  So the generalizability of the 
survey findings is limited by whether the surveyed agencies constitute a fair 
representation of the administrative state overall.67  Indeed, because of the 
methodological limitations imposed by the participating agencies—
including the anonymous nature of the survey and a limited sampling of 
agencies68—the Essay errs on the side of caution and presents a descriptive 
 
 62. Q4 (n=128). 
 63. Q4, cmts. 3, 10, 11. The specific comments are numbered in the data set.  For ease of 
reference, those numbers are cited herein. 
 64. Q5 (n=126). 
 65. Q6 (n=126); Q7 (n=126).  The survey also asked what year the respondent graduated 
from law school (Q6), and such results are similar to the age ranges. Id.  Although outside 
the ambitions of this Essay, it would be interesting to compare whether when one graduated 
from law school affects one‘s views on Chevron and related doctrines. 
 66. Q8 (n=126). 
 67. See generally FLOYD J. FOWLER, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (5th ed. 2014) 
(discussing the broad scope of biases that need to be considered). 
 68. These, of course, are not the only methodological limitations.   For instance, there is 
always the possibility of social desirability bias.  Respondents might feel that they should 
indicate greater familiarity with the interpretive tools (and greater use of them) than they 
actually possess (and do), since they might view it as the most appropriate way to conduct 
their jobs.  The tendency to modify answers in this way arises from two sources, termed 
―self-deception‖ and ―other-deception.‖ See generally H.A. Sackeim & R.C. Gur, Self-
Deception, Self-Confrontation, and Consciousness, in 2 CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-
REGULATION:  ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 139 (G.I. Schwartz & R.D. eds., 1978).  
In this study, attempts were made to minimize social desirability bias.  As for other-
deception, the survey was completely anonymous and taken online outside the presence of 
an interviewer.  As for self-deception, the survey was designed to ask about the same 
interpretive tools in different ways, by name and by principle. See Anton J. Nederhof, 
Methods of Coping with Social Desirability Bias:  A Review, 15 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 263 
(1985).  As discussed, supra notes 58–67, there may also be issues with selection bias, 
incomplete surveys, nonrandomization of main questions order, and other biases that the 
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picture of these particular 128 rule drafters.  (The Bressman and Gluck 
study took the same approach.69)  That said, this study is the most extensive 
inquiry into actual agency interpretive practices to date, and the raw 
numbers shed considerable light on the influence of Chevron and related 
doctrines on agency statutory interpretation. 
II.   LOOKING BACK:  THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES 
IN AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
As discussed in Part I.A, the deference lottery and Chevmore codification 
theories both assume that agencies know about Chevron space and 
Skidmore weight, that these standards play a role in agencies‘ drafting 
decisions, that agencies think about judicial review when drafting statutes, 
and that the agencies may interpret a statute differently based on which 
standard applies.  Part II reports the survey findings related to the former 
two assumptions concerning doctrine familiarity and reported use in rule 
drafting.70  Part III then presents the findings as to the latter two 
assumptions about how Chevron and related doctrines may shape agency 
interpretive behavior. 
A.   Awareness and Use by Name:  Chevron the Big Winner 
With respect to Chevron, Mead, Skidmore, and Auer/Seminole Rock,71 
the rule drafters were asked whether they were familiar by name with these 
―interpretive doctrines related to how much deference courts will accord 
federal agency decisions‖ and whether ―these doctrines play a role in [their] 
drafting decisions.‖72  Figure 1 depicts their responses to these questions.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
study has attempted to minimize but nonetheless cannot be completely controlled or 
measured through the methodology utilized. 
 69. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 923. 
 70. The findings reported in Part II are discussed in greater detail—albeit with a 
different focus—in Part IV of Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, whereas 
the findings discussed in Part III have not been previously reported. 
 71. Auer/Seminole Rock deference instructs courts to give an agency‘s interpretation of 
its own regulation ―controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.‖ Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); accord Auer 
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  This standard lies outside of the scope of the Essay 
but is noted for comparison purposes.  The agency rule drafters were also asked about 
Curtiss-Wright deference, which is a ―super-strong deference to executive department 
interpretations in matters of foreign affairs and national security.‖ Eskridge & Baer, supra 
note 39, at 1100; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  
Only 6 percent indicated any awareness of this doctrine by name, with 2 percent indicating 
the doctrine played a role in their rule-drafting decisions. Q17(e) (n=109); Q18(e) (n=109). 
 72. Q17; Q18. 
 73. Q17(a)–(d) (n=109); Q18(a)–(d) (n=109). 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, Chevron was the big winner at 94 percent 
awareness, followed by Skidmore at 81 percent, Mead at 61 percent, and 
Auer/Seminole Rock at 53 percent.74  The results were similar for their 
reported use in rule drafting, though reported use was less than awareness:  
Chevron at 90 percent, Skidmore at 62 percent, Mead at 49 percent, and 
Auer/Seminole Rock at 39 percent.75  About one in ten (11 percent) rule 
drafters, however, indicated that none of these doctrines played a role in 
their drafting decisions.76 
Indeed, Chevron was the clear winner of the entire study.  Among all 
twenty-two interpretive tools tested in the survey, Chevron was the most 
known by name (at 94 percent) and most reported as playing a role in rule 
drafting (at 90 percent).  The next most known tools were:  the ordinary 
meaning canon (at 92 percent); Skidmore (at 81 percent); and the 
presumption against preemption of state law (at 78 percent).77  The tools 
most reported after Chevron as playing a role in rule drafting were:  the 
whole act rule (presumption of consistent usage throughout statute) (at 89 
percent); the ordinary meaning canon (at 87 percent); Mead (by concept) (at 
80 percent); noscitur a sociis (associated-words canon) (at 79 percent); and 
legislative history (at 76 percent).78 
Moreover, without referring to Chevron by name, the rule drafters were 
asked whether they agreed with the following Chevron restatement:  ―If a 
statute is ambiguous and the agency‘s construction is reasonable, a court 
must accept the agency‘s construction of the statute, even if the agency‘s 
reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory 
interpretation.‖79  About four in five strongly agreed (46 percent) or agreed 
 
 74. Q17(a)–(d) (n=109). 
 75. Q18(a)–(d) (n=109). 
 76. Q18(f) (n=109). 
 77. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 18–20 & fig.1. 
 78. Id. at 18–20 & fig.2. 
 79. Q16(b). 
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(38 percent), and another 11 percent agreed somewhat.  Only 5 percent 
disagreed at all, with one rule drafter indicating strong disagreement.80  In 
sum, the overwhelming majority of rule drafters surveyed indicated that 
they knew, used, and agreed with Chevron space and to a somewhat lesser 
extent knew and used Skidmore weight when drafting rules. 
B.   Awareness by Concept:  Mead the Big Winner 
Although the rule drafters knew (61 percent) and used (49 percent) Mead 
by name less than Chevron or Skidmore, Mead was a big winner when rule 
drafters were asked about the underlying principles—i.e., that congressional 
authorization for, and agency use of, rulemaking or formal adjudication are 
strong indicia of congressional delegation to agencies.81  To measure Mead 
awareness, the rule drafters were asked whether eight different factors 
―affect whether Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or no 
deference) applies to an agency‘s interpretation of an ambiguous statute it 
administers.‖82  Table 1 presents their answers to this question.83 
The leading factors the rule drafters reported to affect if Chevron applies 
were the two Mead principles:  whether Congress authorized the agency to 
engage in rulemaking and/or formal adjudication (84 percent), and whether 
the agency promulgated the interpretation via rulemaking and/or formal 
adjudication (80 percent), followed by whether the agency has expertise 
relevant to interpreting the statutory provisions at issue (79 percent).84  
Fewer than half agreed with the other factors listed:  the interpretation sets 
forth the bounds of the agency‘s jurisdiction (46 percent), longstanding 
nature of agency‘s interpretation (43 percent), its contemporaneous nature 
(20 percent), its furtherance of uniform administration of law (18 percent), 
and the agency‘s political accountability (9 percent).85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80. Q16(b) (n=104).  Because this question asks about the rule drafters‘ agreement with 
particular statements, those who indicated they did not know are not included in the number 
of respondents or the percentage calculation.  No doubt the following comment reflected the 
strong dissenter‘s perspective:  ―‗a court MUST ACCEPT the agency‘s interpretation‘?  Uh, 
no. Maybe they should, but after all, it is courts that review agency interpretations and not 
the other way around.‖ Q16, cmt. 3. 
 81. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
 82. Q19(a)–(h). 
 83. Q19(a)–(h) (n=92).  Because this question asked the rule drafters about which 
factors affect which deference regime applies, the number of respondents considered and 
percentage calculation in Table 1 exclude the seventeen respondents who indicated they did 
not know. 
 84. Q19(a)–(b), (d) (n=92). 
 85. Q19(e)–(h) (n=92). 
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In other words, the Mead doctrine was one of the most understood among 
the interpretive tools tested in this study.  Only Chevron (at 90 percent), the 
whole-act rule (at 89 percent), and the ordinary meaning canon (at 87 
percent) were reported by more rule drafters as playing a role in their rule-
drafting decisions.86  At first blush, one may conclude that these findings on 
Mead support the deference lottery theory as they demonstrate the rule 
drafters‘ prerequisite knowledge about the deference doctrines.  But perhaps 
the opposite is true after City of Arlington v. FCC.87  Because City of 
Arlington appears to guarantee that Chevron applies if these two factors are 
present88 and the rule drafters surveyed understood these two factors to be 
most important, there is far less uncertainty in the first stage of the lottery.  
There would no longer be a meaningful compound lottery, just a one-stage 
lottery under Chevron (or Skidmore).  To be sure, the survey population 
here consists of rule drafters, not other types of agency officials who may 
more often advance agency statutory interpretation through less formal 
means not addressed by City of Arlington where the first-stage lottery 
would still be meaningful.  Moreover, as discussed in Part II.C, there 
remains some uncertainty even here, as the rule drafters surveyed indicated 
that not all ambiguities are created equal. 
C.   Scope of Delegation:  Not All Ambiguities Are the Same 
A somewhat related issue for determining the effect the deference lottery 
(or Chevmore codification) may have on agency interpretive practices is 
whether the agency rule drafters agree with the courts about which types of 
ambiguities in statutes Congress intends for the agency to fill.  After all, if 
rule drafters understand which ambiguities are owed Chevron space, 
Skidmore weight, or no deference at all, that could influence whether 
modifying the deference standard would affect agency behavior.  Similarly, 
if rule drafters already believe certain ambiguities do not trigger Chevron 
 
 86. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 18–20 & fig.2. 
 87. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 88. Id. at 1874. 
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deference, then congressional codification of Skidmore or no deference for 
those ambiguities (think, e.g., preemption, serious constitutional questions, 
or major policy questions) arguably would have no effect on agency 
statutory interpretation. 
To assess the rule drafters‘ understanding about which ambiguities signal 
delegation, the survey asked about the ten types of ambiguities.  Figure 2 
presents the findings as to which kinds of ambiguities or gaps the agency 
rule drafters believed that congressional drafters intend for the federal 
agencies to fill.89 
 
In light of general delegation principles articulated in Chevron and its 
progeny, three of the top four ambiguities reported as signaling delegation 
are not too surprising:  ambiguities relating to the details of implementation 
(at 99 percent), the agency‘s area of expertise (at 92 percent), and omissions 
in the statute (72 percent).90  The only agency rule drafter to dissent on 
implementation details chose ―none of the above,‖ indicating the view that 
Congress did not intend for agencies to fill any of the types of ambiguities 
listed.91 
 
 89. Q15(a)–(j) (n=111).  Two respondents indicated they did not know, so the number of 
respondents considered and percentage calculations in Figure 2 do not include those 
responses. Another rule drafter indicated none of the above, so that response is included. 
 90. Q15(a)–(j) (n=111).  Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) also indicated that Congress 
intends to delegate by ambiguity the division between state and federal agencies when both 
are given implementation roles.  That finding has less relevance for this Essay, but it is 
explored in Part IV.B of Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7. 
 91. Q15(k) (n=111).  Of the eighteen comments, five expressed concern that the 
question could not be answered in a general matter but depended on the statute. Q15, cmts. 
3, 4, 6, 11 & 13.  Another criticized it as ―indulg[ing] the unsupportable fiction that 
congressional drafters have a unified approach on these things.  They don‘t.‖ Q15, cmt. 5. 
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It is also not too surprising based on existing doctrine that the rule 
drafters were less confident and more conflicted about whether Congress 
intends to delegate major questions by ambiguity.  The Court has carved out 
an exception to the Chevron presumption of delegation in the form of the 
major questions doctrine.  Professors Bressman and Gluck nicely frame this 
doctrine as ―a presumption of nondelegation in the face of statutory 
ambiguity over major policy questions or questions of major political or 
economic significance.‖92  The doctrine exists, as Justice Scalia creatively 
put it, because it is presumed Congress ―does not . . . hide elephants in 
mouseholes.‖93 
The rule drafters were asked about ambiguities or gaps related to the 
major questions in three ways, with the results as follows:  ―major policy 
questions‖ at 56 percent, ―questions of major economic significance‖ at 49 
percent, and ―questions of major political significance‖ at 32 percent.94  In 
other words, far fewer rule drafters indicated that Congress intends to 
delegate ambiguities implicating major questions than those discussed 
above concerning implementation details, agency expertise, and statutory 
omissions.  Yet despite Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, a majority 
indicated that Congress does intend to delegate by ambiguity major policy 
questions when framed as such—instead of as major economic or political 
questions.  So, there does seem to be some disconnect. 
On the other hand, three in four (75 percent) rule drafters indicated that 
Congress intends for agencies to fill gaps or ambiguities relating to the 
agency‘s own jurisdiction or regulatory authority.95  And in the question 
about which factors affect whether Chevron deference applies, nearly half 
(46 percent) indicated that it matters ―[w]hether the agency‘s statutory 
interpretation sets forth the bounds of the agency‘s jurisdiction or 
regulatory authority.‖96  While such jurisdictional questions arguably could 
be viewed as major policy questions,97 respondents‘ views are consistent 
with City of Arlington, which held that ―an agency‘s interpretation of a 
statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of its regulatory authority (that 
is, its jurisdiction) is entitled to [Chevron] deference.‖98 
By contrast, only about one in four (24 percent) rule drafters believed 
that Congress intends for federal agencies to fill gaps implicating serious 
constitutional questions.99  That was the clear loser for this question.  And 
 
 92. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 1003. 
 93. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also Jacob Loshin 
& Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010) 
(reviewing literature and providing summary of doctrinal development). 
 94. Q15(b)–(d) (n=111). 
 95. Q15(f) (n=111). 
 96. Q19(c) (n=109).  But that question did not ask in what way such factors would affect 
how Chevron deference applies. 
 97. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 1005–06 (so noting); accord 
Christopher J. Walker, Does Congress Really Mean to Delegate Interpretative Authority to 
Agencies?, JOTWELL (Aug. 16, 2013), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/does-congress-really-
mean-to-delegate-interpretative-authority-to-agencies/. 
 98. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013). 
 99. Q15(e) (n=111). 
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that finding challenges at least this author‘s prior argument that agencies are 
better positioned than courts to address constitutional questions in statutes 
they administer in the first instance; thus, perhaps the empirical realities of 
agency statutory interpretation support the majority view that the 
constitutional avoidance canon should trump Chevron deference.100 
Finally, regarding preemption of state law, fewer than half (46 percent) 
agreed that Congress intends to delegate preemption questions by 
ambiguity.101  This substantial but not overwhelming response is similar to 
the divide in the scholarly debate and may be due in part to the Supreme 
Court‘s failure to date to provide more clarity.102   Similarly, roughly half 
(47 percent) indicated that they use the presumption against preemption 
when interpreting statutes.103  These findings cast some doubt on the 
efficacy of Chevmore codification in the preemption context.  If over half of 
the rule drafters surveyed already do not assume Chevron deference applies 
to agency preemption decisions—and, indeed, half apply the presumption 
against preemption when there is an ambiguity—then congressional 
modification from Chevron space to Skidmore weight would have no effect 
on agency statutory interpretation at least with respect to those rule drafters.  
(Such Skidmore codification may, of course, still have an effect on judicial 
behavior.) 
*     *     * 
In sum, the vast majority of agency rule drafters surveyed knew of 
Chevron and Skidmore and indicated that the doctrines played a role in their 
rule-drafting decisions; they similarly understood the Mead principles for 
delegation.  Many also understood the major questions doctrine but had 
conflicting views on whether other types of ambiguities signal 
congressional delegation and thus trigger Chevron deference.  If the rule 
drafters surveyed are representative of the regulatory state generally, then 
the bureaucrats clearly listen to the courts.  And these findings strongly 
suggest that three decades of Chevron and its accompanying evolution have 
permeated statutory interpretation inside the regulatory state. 
III.   LOOKING FORWARD:  THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE 
MODIFICATION OF THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES 
That the rule drafters know these deference doctrines and that these 
doctrines play a role in their rule-drafting decisions only get us halfway to 
the empirical foundation for the deference lottery and Chevmore 
codification theories.  This part presents the findings as to the second half 
about how these doctrines may affect agency interpretive practices—i.e., 
whether the rule drafters think about judicial review standards when 
 
 100. See Walker, Brand X Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 19, at 159–61; see also 
Mashaw, supra note 4, at 508 (noting that ―administrators who fail to pursue implementation 
any time a constitutional issue looms on their horizon could not possibly carry out their 
legislative mandates effectively‖). 
 101. Q15(g) (n=111). 
 102. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 1004 & nn.396–97. 
 103. Q25(a), (c)–(d) (n=99). 
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drafting rules and interpret a statute differently based on which deference 
standard applies.  This part concludes by looking at other factors that also 
could influence the effect of judicial or legislative modification of the 
deference doctrines. 
A.   The Effect of Judicial Review Standards 
To attempt to test these two empirical assumptions for the deference 
lottery and Chevmore codification theories, the survey asked whether the 
rule drafters agreed with seven statements concerning their drafting 
practices and subsequent judicial review.  Figure 3 presents the findings for 
those questions,104 which can be grouped into four sets of observations. 
 
First, nearly nine in ten rule drafters strongly agreed (46 percent) or 
agreed (41 percent)—and another 11 percent somewhat agreed—that 
―[w]hen drafting rules and interpreting statutes, agency drafters such as 
yourself think about subsequent judicial review.‖105  This broad agreement 
is consistent with their responses as to the use of the deference doctrines 
discussed in Part II and is obviously a prerequisite for the deference lottery 
and Chevmore codification theories.  That said, when asked if ―[a]gency 
expectations about which level of deference (Chevron, Skidmore, no 
deference, etc.) courts will apply to its statutory interpretation affect the 
agency‘s drafting process,‖ only about half strongly agreed (10 percent) or 
agreed (36 percent), with another third (35 percent) who somewhat 
 
 104. Q20(a) (n=106) (nk=0), (b) (n=100) (nk=7), (c) (n=98) (nk=9), (d) (n=93) (nk=14), 
(e) (n=86) (nk=21), (f) (n=72) (nk=35), (g) (n=85) (nk=22).  A varying number of rule 
drafters indicated that they did not know for particular statements, as reported in the ―no 
knowledge‖ (nk) number.  Accordingly, the number of respondents considered and 
percentage calculations in Figure 3 do not include those responses. 
 105. Q20(a) (n=106) (nk=0). 
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agreed.106  In all events, without knowing how judicial review affects their 
drafting, this does not tell us too much. 
Second, only about three in ten strongly agreed (3 percent) or agreed (25 
percent) that ―[t]he level of deference (Chevron, Skidmore, no deference, 
etc.) that courts apply to a particular agency statutory interpretation is 
reasonably predictable;‖ and half (49 percent) somewhat agreed.107  In 
other words, at least among the rule drafters surveyed, these findings cast 
some doubt—though perhaps not much doubt, as nearly half (49 percent) of 
rule drafters only agreed ―somewhat‖ and roughly another fourth strongly 
disagreed (4 percent) or disagreed (19 percent)—on whether there is 
reasonable uncertainty as would be required at the first stage of the 
deference lottery.  The City of Arlington Court‘s clarifying opinion may 
have reduced the level of uncertainty, especially for this particular 
population (rule drafters) of agency officials.  Moreover, reasonable 
uncertainty has nothing to do with Chevmore codification or judicial 
modification at the second stage of the deference lottery. 
Third, about four in five strongly agreed (38 percent) or agreed (45 
percent)—and another 17 percent somewhat agreed—that ―[i]f Chevron 
deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) applies to an 
agency‘s interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers, the agency is 
more likely to prevail in court.‖108  Relatedly, when asked the same thing 
about Skidmore deference versus no deference, only one third strongly 
agreed (3 percent) or agreed (29 percent) with another 38 percent who 
somewhat agreed.109  In other words, the rule drafters surveyed provided 
strong support for the critical assumption of the deference lottery and 
Chevmore codification theories that agencies know that the likelihood of 
success in court is greater if Chevron applies. 
Fourth, two questions attempted, perhaps unartfully, to test the final 
empirical foundation necessary for either theory—that federal agencies are 
more aggressive in their interpretive efforts if they know Chevron deference 
will apply.  The results were roughly the same whether the question was 
posed as being more aggressive if Chevron applies or less aggressive if 
Chevron does not: 
 ―If the agency knows or strongly believes that Chevron deference 
(as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) will apply to 
a particular agency interpretation, the agency will be more 
willing to advance a more aggressive interpretation.‖:  about two 
in five strongly agreed (10 percent) or agreed (33 percent), and 
another 40 percent somewhat agreed;110 and 
 
 106. Q20(c) (n=98) (nk=9). 
 107. Q20(b) (n=100) (nk=7). 
 108. Q20(d) (n=93) (nk=14). 
 109. Q20(d) (n=72) (nk=35).  This number does not reflect the fact that thirty-five of the 
107 respondents (33 percent) to this question indicated they did not know the answer 
compared to only fourteen (13 percent) for the Chevron question. Cf. Q19(d) (n=93) 
(nk=14). 
 110. Q20(e) (n=86) (nk=21). 
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 ―If the agency knows or strongly believes that Chevron deference 
will not apply to a particular agency interpretation, the agency 
will be less willing to advance a more aggressive interpretation.‖: 
about two in five strongly agreed (7 percent) or agreed (31 
percent), and another 45 percent somewhat agreed.111 
Although not as overwhelming as many of the other findings, this two-in-
five bottom line (38 to 43 percent)—which becomes an even more 
impressive four-in-five number (82 to 83 percent) if those who ―somewhat 
agreed‖ are included—provides some support for the empirical assumption 
that federal agencies draft differently when they know Chevron deference 
applies.  In other words, if Congress or the courts were to strip Chevron 
deference from a particular statutory interpretation, a fair number of the rule 
drafters surveyed seemed to agree that their agencies would be less 
aggressive in their interpretive practices. 
There are, of course, a number of factors that caution against too much 
enthusiasm.  For instance, neither formulation of the question garnered a 
majority of ―strongly agree‖ or ―agree‖ votes, with ―agree somewhat‖ being 
the predominant answer.  Similarly, these numbers do not take into account 
the substantial number of rule drafters who indicated that they did not know 
the answer—21 of the 107 total respondents (20 percent) for the first 
question and 22 of the 107 total respondents (21 percent) for the second.  
These cautions are in addition to those methodological limitations 
addressed in Part I.B in that the numbers are reported purely descriptively 
without attempting to generalize beyond the rule drafters surveyed. 
Moreover, some of the comments rule drafters volunteered further 
suggest caution.  For instance, one rule drafter remarked:  ―I think 
policymakers choose the policy that they believe is best, without being very 
influenced by the likelihood of prevailing in court, partly taking into 
account other factors, like likelihood of challenge.‖112  Another similarly 
noted that ―[l]egal risk is considered by decision-makers, but the policy 
outcomes generally outweigh the legal risks, particularly any legal niceties 
related to Chevron v. Skidmore deference.‖113  In other words, the judicial 
deference standard is just one of many factors that affect agency statutory 
interpretation, and it may be a pretty insignificant factor in the large 
scheme.  And a couple rule drafters indicated that they had never personally 
taken into account or observed others taking into account the type of 
deference the agency expected to receive.114 
On the other hand, for at least two reasons these numbers may 
underrepresent the influence of such modification of agency statutory 
 
 111. Q20(g) (n=85) (nk=22). 
 112. Q20, cmt. 4. 
 113. Q20, cmt. 5. 
 114. Q20, cmt. 9 (―My experience involves no case where the agency calibrated its 
interpretation of a statute according to the type of deference it expected to receive, e.g., 
Chevron v. Skidmore.‖); Q20, cmt. 10 (―In the time I‘ve been writing regulations, no one has 
ever specifically discussed Chevron or Skidmore deference in my hearing.  So as far as I see, 
it‘s not that relevant.‖). 
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interpretation.  First, because all respondents were career civil servants (as 
opposed to political appointees), they may not have wanted to confess to 
being more ―aggressive‖ in statutory interpretation based on whether they 
thought they would prevail in subsequent litigation—reflecting self- or 
other-deception social desirability bias.115  The survey was designed to 
mitigate the effect of such biases.  As for other-deception, the survey was 
anonymous and administered online outside the presence of a supervisor or 
peers.  As for self-deception, the questions discussed in Part III were asked 
as to what federal agency rule drafters generally would do, not what the 
respondent personally would do.  Similarly, as discussed, this particular 
question was asked in two ways—i.e., whether a federal agency would be 
less willing or more willing to advance an aggressive interpretation based 
on whether Chevron applies.  Although the survey design may mitigate 
some social desirability bias, it likely does not eliminate it, thus suggesting 
that the respondents may have understated the effect Chevron deference has 
on agency interpretive practices. 
Second, these questions on interpretive aggressiveness may be above the 
respondents‘ pay grade.  Perhaps that type of policymaking activity is 
reserved for the political appointees who were not surveyed.  Again, 
however, the questions asked whether federal agencies—not the 
respondents personally—would be less or more aggressive, and, as 
discussed in Part II.B, the rule drafters surveyed have many years of 
extensive experience inside the regulatory state.  Civil servants may not be 
privy to all decision making at their agencies, but surely they likely are 
aware of some of it with respect to interpretive efforts.  In other words, it 
may be a conservative understatement in reporting that two in five agreed or 
strongly agreed—and another two in five agreed somewhat—that federal 
agencies are more aggressive when Chevron applies. 
So where does that leave us with respect to the deference lottery and 
Chevmore codification hypothesis that modifying the deference standard 
would affect how aggressive an agency may be in statutory interpretation?  
The study‘s findings provide strong support that agency rule drafters think 
about judicial review when drafting statutes and understand Chevron and 
Skidmore and how their chances in court are better under Chevron.  Many 
rule drafters also reported that federal agencies advance more aggressive 
statutory interpretations if they know Chevron applies.  But broader 
generalizations about whether agencies draft more aggressively when they 
know Chevron applies probably cannot be drawn from this study, based on 
the responses given and the methodological limitations inherent in the 
study.  Notwithstanding, the findings uncovered should encourage deeper 
empirical inquiry. 
 
 115. For further discussion on social desirability bias, see supra note 68; Nederhof, supra 
note 68; Sackeim & Gur, supra note 68. 
726 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
B.   The Effect of Repeated-Game Factors 
Regarding the potential effect of judicial or legislative modification of 
the deference standards, one of the comments a rule drafter volunteered 
merits mention:  ―Whether Chevron deference will apply is only one of 
many factors that goes into an Agency‘s decision to take a more aggressive 
stance.‖116  Indeed, as the author has more fully explored elsewhere, the 
predictive effect of modifying the deference lottery may be frustrated by the 
fact that ―agencies in the modern administrative state do not face a win-or-
go-home contest when playing the lottery.  Instead, it is a repeated game—
indeed, a dialogue between courts and agencies—where agencies have 
multiple opportunities to play again (and win).‖117  For similar reasons, the 
repeated nature of this game may also mitigate the effect of Chevmore 
codification. 
Accordingly, the rule drafters were asked about three additional doctrines 
that allow agencies to replay the lottery in the event that they lose the first 
time: 
 Brand X (a prior judicial interpretation does not always trump an 
agency‘s subsequent and different interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute);118 
 Ventura Ordinary Remand Rule (when a court finds an agency‘s 
decision is incorrect, absent exceptional circumstances, the 
matter should be remanded to the agency for further 
proceedings);119 and 
 Governmental Inter-Circuit Nonacquiescence (a ruling by one 
circuit does not force the agency to abandon its interpretation in 
other circuits).120 
Figure 4 presents the findings from these questions.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116. Q20, cmt. 1. 
 117. Walker, supra note 10, at 74 (footnote omitted). 
 118. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005). The author explores the implications of Brand X on the role of constitutional 
avoidance under Chevron in Walker, Brand X Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 19, at 
156–82. 
 119. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam) (describing it as ―the 
law‘s ordinary remand requirement‖).  The author traces the evolution of administrative 
law‘s ordinary remand rule in Part I of Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 19. 
 120. See Walker, supra note 10, at 85–87 (reviewing literature and discussing this 
doctrine in context of deference lottery). 
 121. Q22(a)–(c) (n=99); Q23(a)–(c) (n=99). 
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With respect to these repeated-game factors, about one in four 
(24 percent) rule drafters indicated they did not know any of them, and 
nearly three in five (57 percent) indicated none plays a role in their drafting 
decisions.  Governmental inter-circuit nonacquiescence was the most 
known at 57 percent, followed by the remand rule at 45 percent and Brand 
X at 43 percent.  By contrast, the doctrine that played a role among most 
rule drafters was Brand X at 29 percent, followed by nonacquiescence at 25 
percent and the remand rule at 21 percent.122  In sum, these findings do not 
seem to provide particularly compelling evidence to undermine the effect 
that deference standard modification may have on agency interpretive 
practices—at least at the agency rule-drafting level. 
But these repeated-game factors are not just implicated at the drafting 
stage.  When defending agency interpretations, government litigators 
undoubtedly know and use these principles. That was at least this author‘s 
experience while working on the Civil Appellate Staff at the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), which defends federal agencies and their 
statutory interpretations in a variety of contexts.123  Thus, if these doctrines 
are successfully implemented to save an agency statutory interpretation, the 
predictive effect of modifying the deference standard would be 
undermined—regardless whether the agency rule drafters also knew about 
and used these doctrines when drafting.  This point may be reinforced by 
 
 122. When asked if they agreed with the Brand X principle (without referring to Brand X 
by name), a strong majority agreed (39 percent) or strongly agreed (25 percent), and another 
10 percent agreed somewhat.  But one in about four disagreed (21 percent) or strongly 
disagreed (5 percent). Q16(c) (n=102).  One rule drafter commented that whether an agency 
may choose a different construction ―depends on the circumstances.  A court‘s interpretation 
could make it difficult to have a different interpretation.‖ Q16, cmt. 2. 
 123. For a helpful description of the DOJ‘s appellate staffs, see Al Daniel, The Role of 
DOJ’s Appellate Staffs in the Supreme Court and in the Courts of Appeals, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/the-role-of-dojs-appellate-staffs-in-
the-supreme-court-and-in-the-courts-of-appeals/. 
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the fact that agency rule drafters and litigators are often not closely 
connected.  One rule drafter observed: 
[M]ost rule drafters and attorneys that practice admin law in government 
do not handle the litigation associated with rules. I think that is kicked to 
DOJ, so I definitely think there is a big disconnect between drafters and 
litigators/those who are defending the rule in court.  We often don‘t talk 
to each other until the rule is challenged.  There is a lot we can learn from 
the litigators, ways we can be more proactive in rulemaking rather than 
defensive after the fac[t].124 
Accordingly, to fully understand how the repeated-game nature of agency 
statutory interpretation may temper the effect of judicial or legislative 
modification of the deference standards, much more empirical investigation 
needs to be done.  And these are just three of the many factors other than 
the deference standard that could affect how aggressive agencies are in their 
interpretive efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
After thirty years of Chevron, we finally have at least a partial view of its 
effect inside the regulatory state.  The findings uncovered in this study 
arguably confirm common intuition:  similar to how Chevron has become 
one of the most well-known interpretive tools used by courts, litigants, and 
even congressional drafters,125 the agency rule drafters surveyed indicated 
that Chevron is the most known and most reported as playing a role in their 
rule-drafting decisions of all twenty-two interpretive tools included in the 
empirical study.  And Mead and Skidmore are not too far behind.  
Moreover, the rule drafters provided some support for the intuition that 
federal agencies are more aggressive in their interpretive practices if they 
know Chevron applies. 
But this Essay also underscores how much more work needs to be done 
to understand how the deference standards affect agency statutory 
interpretation and, in particular, whether federal agencies are more 
aggressive in their interpretive efforts if they know Chevron applies.  
Fortunately, with the advent of Chevmore codification, empirically 
assessing Chevron‘s effect on agency statutory interpretation should 
become somewhat easier.  Instead of surveying agency rule drafters about 
their perceived practices and hoping their answers are not too distorted by 
self- or other-deception biases, we may now have a natural experiment 
between those areas where Congress expressly says Chevron does not apply 
(e.g., OCC preemption) and those where Chevron clearly still does. 
This is not just an academic exercise.  After all, Chevron and related 
doctrines attempt to strike a proper separation of powers balance between 
the branches of government by patrolling the delegation of authority from 
the principal (Congress) to its unelected agents in the regulatory state.  
 
 124. Q20, cmt. 5. 
 125. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 928 fig.2 (listing Chevron deference as 
the interpretive tool reported as most used by the congressional drafters surveyed). 
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Whether the deference standards help to faithfully control lawmaking by 
regulation goes to the democratic (and perhaps constitutional) legitimacy of 
the modern administrative state.126  Hopefully it will not take another thirty 
years to have an even richer understanding of agency statutory 
interpretation. 
 
 126. This legitimacy point is explored in greater detail in Walker, Inside Agency 
Interpretation, supra note 7; see also Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 8, at 801 
(concluding that ―[i]f the democratic legitimacy of courts rests on at least a partial dialogue 
with Congress, then we need more study not only of Congress, but also of agencies and 
lobbyists‘ interpretive practices‖); Mashaw, supra note 4, at 537 (―Inquiry into the empirical 
realities of agency interpretive practice can provide . . . an essential step in the assessment of 
the legitimacy of administrative governance.‖). 
